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Summary
We analyze the role of "the" utility discount rate and its implications to generation-specific and societal
altruism and egoism, respectively, in a neoclassical framework. It is worked out clearly, that two differ-
ent utility discount rates have to be distinguished: An (inverse) altruism-parameter and a social discount
rate. High levels of the altruism-parameter depict relatively weak altruistic behavior. However, high
levels of the social discount rate are in general introduced to argue within egoism-models. The often
found conjecture that the level of "the" discount rate determines whether we argue altruistically or ego-
istically can, therefore, not be confirmed. It is stated that rather the assumed utility/welfare function is
decisive for egoistic and altruistic analyses. Connecting our considerations with the utilitarian require-
ment for equal treatment of all affected individuals (generations) we conclude that the social discount
rate has to be set to zero in egoism- as well as altruism-models and, additionally, the altruism-parameter
has to be infinitely high. This shows clearly that the level of "the" discount rate is insufficient for deci-
sions whether a specific analysis is altruistic or egoistic. At the end of our analysis we draw some con-
clusions applying our considerations to simulation models with respect to global warming.
1 Introduction
Cost-benefit-analyses are undertaken either in the framework of optimal growth theory or in
overlapping-generations-models (OLG-models). To judge projects concerning generations
living in the (far) future, we have to take into account adequately their project-induced effects
in the planning decision today. Generally, traditional cost-benefit-analyses include future effects
in a diminished extent due to the usage of positive utility discount rates.1 The same is valid if
there is positive utility discounting in optimal growth theory2 as well as in OLG-models where
a societal decision-maker discounts generation-specific present value welfare levels once again
to the planning period.3 Current living generations are favored at the expense of future living
                                               
1
 See among others Brown (1998).
2
 See Nordhaus (1994).
3
 See Blanchard/Fischer (1989).
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ones. Therefore, we want to label such types of models "egoism-models" because of the inher-
ent assumption that today's living generations act on their own behalf.
In contrast, to avoid systematic underevaluations of future generations, some authors argue in
model-types explicitly considering interests of future generations.4 Generations living today act
- at least partially - on behalf of future generations because increasing utilities in the future
augment today's living generations' utilities as well. Such analyses can be labeled "altruism-
models". Thereby, the degree of altruism can be measured by the level of the utility discount
rate of each generation with respect to altruistic utility units: If it is set to zero, perfect altruism
is depicted in altruistic OLG-models (see below). The higher it is set, the less pronounced al-
truistic behavior of specific generations is given.5 The usage of "low" utility discount rates in
general depicts "altruistic behavior" due to relatively higher "weights" for future occurring ef-
fects.
Our analysis keeps in mind that the argumentation so far is completely independent of the as-
sumed utility and welfare functions, respectively. Integrating them in our analysis, we will
show, that the level of the utility discount rate can neither be used as main indicator for inter-
generational altruism nor for egoism when we analyze its level. Thus, a positive utility discount
rate depicts altruistic as well as egoistic behavior to a lesser or higher extent - dependent
mainly on the assumed utility and welfare function and the method of aggregation of genera-
tion-specific utility present values.
2 Utility Discounting in Different Model Frameworks
Mathematically, an altruistic welfare function can be given analogic to Bernheim/Ray as fol-
lows:6
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We assume a simple OLG-model where two generations are alive simultaneously. The cardinal
welfare level of generation t, Wt, is measurable for each generation. Welfare consists of an
"original" utility level Ut - which is given as combination of physical available consumption
units 1c(t) (first period of lifetime, "young") and 2c(t+1) (second period of lifetime, "old") dur-
ing the lifetime of generation t - and the sum of the discounted utility levels of all subsequent
                                               
4
 See Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger (1998).
5
 See Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger (1998), p. 333.
6
 See Bernheim/Ray (1987). An application is given in Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger (1998).
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generations Us, s>t ("altruistic utilities"). The welfare level of generation two (W2), for exam-
ple, is given by:7
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Generations take into account all future project-induced utility as well as consumption effects
due to altruistic behavior. However, with growing time distances - indicated by increasing s
and constant t - altruism of earlier living generations decreases according to the utility discount
factor (1+δ)-s+t. The more distant future generations are, the less weight is put on their utility
effects in today's planning decisions and the less do they influence the efficiency of today's
projects. Each generation behaves perfectly altruistic if the utility discount rate δ (the
"(inverse) altruism parameter") is set to zero. This implies that today living generations con-
sider future generations' utilities according to their current level. Obviously, the higher the dis-
count rate is set, the less distinct altruism is given.8
The assumption of an OLG-utility function according to Bernheim/Ray (1987) implies that
additional welfare effects of future generations are explicitly taken into account by today's liv-
ing generations. Reference for welfare considerations of generation 3 (W3), for instance, is the
second period of the planning horizon t2.9 The original (i.e. generation-specific, reflex of physi-
cally available consumption units) and the altruistic (i.e. future generations' available con-
sumption units) utilities have to be referred to t2, in which the original utility of generation
three has been taken into account as (discounted) altruistic utility of generation two. This is
valid for the whole planning horizon and all generations. To calculate an aggregate welfare
level of all individuals living within the planning horizon, a societal decision-maker has to sum
up all generation-specific welfare levels as they are given at the beginning of each respective
lifetime. Table 1 illustrates our considerations:
                                               
7
 We keep in mind that each living generation usually discounts utilities in their second lifetime-period to the
beginning of their respective lives. This is not explicitly depicted in our mathematical formulation but implic-
itly taken into account.
8
 In this kind of utility function, the degree of altruism can be lowered by using high discount rates but it never
completely disappears because of its exponential form.
9
 See table 1.
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Generation t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 L W
1 U(2ct1) θ-1U(1ct2,2ct3) θ-2U(1ct3,2ct4) θ-3U(1ct4,2ct5) θ-4U(1ct5,2ct6) θ-5U(1ct6,2ct7) L W1
2 U(1ct1,2ct2) θ-1U(1ct2,2ct3) θ-2U(1ct3,2ct4) θ-3U(1ct4,2ct5) θ-4U(1ct5,2ct6) θ-5U(1ct6,2ct7) L W2
3 U(1ct2,2ct3) θ-1U(1ct3,2ct4) θ-2U(1ct4,2ct5) θ-3U(1ct5,2ct6) θ-4U(1ct6,2ct7) L W3
4 U(1ct3,2ct4) θ-1U(1ct4,2ct5) θ-2U(1ct5,2ct6) θ-3U(1ct6,2ct7) L W4
5 U(1ct4,2ct5) θ-1U(1ct5,2ct6) θ-2U(1ct6,2ct7) L W5
6 U(1ct5,2ct6) θ-1U(1ct6,2ct7) L W6
7 U(1ct6,2ct7) L W7
M O M
Table 1: θ≡(1+δ) denotes the (inverse) discount factor. The utility function U represents the combined genera-
tion-specific lifetime utility of each affected generation. Obviously, cti (the complete consumption effect in pe-
riod ti) is split up into 1cti (young generation's consumption in ti) and 2cti (old generation's consumption in ti).
Consumption effects of the old generation living in t1 is given in line 1. It considers all utilities of the subse-
quent generations although it only lives for one more period. The last column denotes the total generation-
specific (original and altruistic) welfare effect Wt of any project that is given by summing up all effects during
the planning horizon. The dark shaded area shows these time-periods, where a societal decision maker dis-
counts generation specific present value utilities to the beginning of the planning horizon. In contrast to the
assumed OLG-settings, considerations according to optimal growth models in the Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995)-
sense can be undertaken as follows: In each time-period one single consumption effect ct is available which
leads to a generation specific utility-level U(ct). Aggregating all individual effects can then be interpreted as to
sum up all "original" utility effects in the main diagonal in table 1. Thereby, future living generations utilities'
are discounted by a societal decision-maker using a positive utility discount rate ("egoism-model").
The longer the planning horizon is extended, the more often altruistic utility effects of future
generations are taken into account. This means that future consumption effects are taken into
consideration in multiple ways. For example, the consumption amount 1ct3 of generation 4 in
period t3, when its members are young, is physically feasible for them at this time-period. Ad-
ditionally, generations 1, 2 and 3 take these consumption units into account altruistically and
discounted in their respective utility function. Multiple considerations are the more pro-
nounced, the longer the planning horizon is extending (see the columns (time-periods) of table
1). The more distinct the respective altruistic behavior of all generations is given ("small" δ),
the more weight is put on altruistic utility effects in societal evaluations. If the altruism-pa-
rameter is set to zero, we argue in a world of perfect altruism. In contrast, the higher the altru-
ism-parameter is set, the more the degree of altruism decreases. This shows, that in altruism-
models the level of "the" utility discount rate represents the degree of altruistic behavior of all
generations living within the planning horizon.
In almost all OLG-models (see e.g. Bernheim/Ray (1987) and Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger
(1998)) the aggregation of generation-specific utility levels of a societal decision-maker is done
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by discounting them once again to the beginning of the planning horizon (in table 1: time-
period t1).10 The social welfare or aggregation function is given as follows:
(3) ( )W Wsocietal j
j
T
j
= + ⋅
−
=
∑ 1
1
ρ  ,
where ρ can be labeled as "aggregation" or "social" discount rate. In contrast to the utility dis-
count rate δ, ρ always has an egoistic effect in societal decision-making. In this model-
framework, aggregating generation-specific utility levels for societal welfare statements mixes
altruistic (welfare-function) and egoistic (utility discounting of future generations' lifetime pre-
sent value utilities) elements (see below).
Compared to altruistic OLG-models, societal welfare functions in egoism-models are com-
pletely different. Taking optimal growth theory as an example, a representative infinitely-living
agent maximizes his present value of all periodical utility units until the end of the planning
horizon. He/She receives all effects which occur within the planning horizon. During the whole
lifetime of the representative agent, consumption units increase its utility level at the time-
period of occurrence: Utility depends solely on physically available consumption units. No al-
truistic utility units do occur at all. This has two reasons: Firstly, due to the existence of just
one single person, nobody is able to get any altruistic utilities simply because he/she is not in
existence. Secondly, if we interpret an optimal growth model according to Barro/Sala-i-Martin
(1995) as a sequence of successively living generations with one time-period lifetime, we are
able to roughly approach OLG-settings. Consumption effects always lead to original (i.e. gen-
eration-specific) utilities at the time-period of occurrence.11 For present value calculations, they
once again are related to the beginning of the planning horizon by discounting future utilities
using the "social discount rate" ρ. This reflects egoistic behavior in two different ways: (1)
Generations which are alive relatively close to the planning horizon get higher "weights" in
intertemporal decisions even if the same consumption effect occurs throughout the whole
planning horizon (see below). (2) Altruistic utility units do not occur at all because there are no
recipients of such utility units. The second term in equation (1) is assumed to be zero either
due to explicit setting or because of discounting altruistic utility units by very high discount
rates.
                                               
10
 See e.g. Gerlagh (1999), pp. 36, for an application and Blanchard/Fischer (1989), pp. 98, for more funda-
mental work.
11
 For one period lifetimes of each generation we can interpret all "original" utility effects in table 1 as the rele-
vant ones for this very special kind of OLG-setting.
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3 "The" Utility Discount Rate as Main Indicator of Altruism and/or
Egoism?
Within our two concepts, two different utility discount rates have been identified. The first one
- δ - (altruism-parameter) is relevant within the lifetime of altruistic generations. The second
one - ρ - (social discount rate) has to be used by a societal decision-maker to aggregate gen-
eration specific lifetime utilities to the beginning of the planning horizon.12 Discounting utilities
leads to distortions in both model-types. It can be stated in egoism-models that the higher the
social discount rate is set, the more pronounced egoistic behaviour is depicted and vice versa.
This tallies with the conventional neoclassical methodology of equal treatment of all affected
generations. However, if we discount generation-specific utility present values in altruism-
models, it can only be interpreted as a belated attempt to implement egoistic behavior in these
kinds of models. Altruism is (at least partially) compensated by introducing a societal accoun-
ter. Principally, three cases exist: (1) overall altruism (egoism effects are dominated by altru-
ism, which should be the most common case for altruism-models), (2) overall egoism (altruism
effects are dominated by egoism), and (3) neutrality (the model-inherent altruism is exactly
compensated by a societal accounter). However, neutrality can be attained in a much simpler
way by using the discounting method of Bayer/Cansier (1998), Bayer/Cansier (1999) and
Bayer (2000) ("Generation Adjusted Discounting", GAD).13 Additionally, the compensation of
distortions by mixing altruism and egoism is dubious: A decision maker who uses altruism-
models for intergenerational decision making and combines them with egoistic behavior by
discounting future generations' lifetime-utilities acts schizophrenically.
Cost-benefit-analyses which are carried out in altruism-models are biased in favor of projects
with (high) future consumption effects due to multiple considerations of altruistic utility units.
It is completely unimportant, whether the determined generation-specific welfare effects (at the
beginning of each respective life) are taken into account either in an undiscounted way or if
they will be discounted to the planning time period by a societal decision-maker once again.
From a societal viewpoint generational distortions are the more distinct (1) the lower the altru-
ism parameter is set and (2) the longer the planning horizon is assumed and the occurrence of
consumption effects extends.
                                               
12
 It is meaningful to distinguish both types of discount rates by using different symbols, although both rates
can be assumed to be of identical levels.
13
 This discounting method explicitly differentiates between utility and consumption discounting in intra- as
well as intergenerational decision-making.
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This is completely different in egoism-models. Discounting utilities while aggregating them
implies that equal consumption effects lead to unequal utility present values. Intertemporal
decisions are mainly determined by consumption effects which mostly occur within current
living "generations". Cost-benefit-analyses are biased in favor of projects with (high) con-
sumption effects which mainly occur contemporarily. The higher the social discount rate is set,
the more pronounced egoistic behavior is given.
However, arguing in a neoclassical model framework with the inherent assumption of equal
treatment of all affected individuals, we have to conclude that this requirement ("equal treat-
ment") is not fulfilled in both approaches. Furthermore, they have to be interpreted differently
in our two different approaches with respect to the level of "the" utility discount rate: Using
egoism-models, a zero social discount rate leads to the fulfillment of generational "equal treat-
ment". Each generation will be ranked equally. However, in altruism-models the same physical
consumption units are repeatedly taken into account. The longer the planning horizon is as-
sumed, the more generations are taken into account in the altruistic utility function and the
more weight will be placed upon them. Equal treatment can only be fulfilled if we heavily dis-
count future altruistic effects. Perfect equal treatment is only feasible if we use an infinitely
high utility discount rate (altruism-parameter). Solely in this case each utility unit (consumption
unit) is taken into account just once. Obviously, this is completely unrealistic. In general, the
higher the altruism-parameter during each generations lifetime is set, the less pronounced altru-
istic behavior is modeled.
In other words: Each project-induced utility effect has to be considered according to its physi-
cal availability in egoism- as well as altruism-models. If an effect occurs in period ti, it is physi-
cally available only for the one (egoism) or two (altruism) generations living in this certain pe-
riod. Multiple considerations in altruism-models have to be avoided for judging societal profit-
ability of projects by a social planner as well as underratings in egoism-models. Thus, the utili-
zation of different types of utility discount rates and intergenerational neutrality according to
utilitarianism has to be carefully analyzed: In altruism-models one has to use high altruism pa-
rameters to realize equal treatment between generations. To obtain neutrality between genera-
tions in egoism-models, however, we have to set the social discount rate to zero. Thus, to state
whether egoistic or altruistic behavior is depicted it is insufficient to concentrate the argumen-
tation on the level of the utility discount rate. In egoism-models, pronounced egoism is mod-
eled by using high social discount rates. The utilitarian requirement of equal treatment is not
fulfilled in this case. The same level of the utility discount rate in altruism-models, however,
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generally describes the attempt to comply with the utilitarian necessity. In this case, altruism is
modeled weakly.14
Both model types show methodological deficiencies because of their arbitrary discrimination of
certain generations. This especially contradicts neoclassical efficiency criteria which are based
on utilitarianism and require equal treatment of each affected individual. However, the reason
for the arbitrariness is not the level of "the" utility discount rate. Altruistic or egoistic behavior
is determined by the use of an intertemporal welfare function including the treatment of future
utility effects. Non-schizophrenic intertemporal decision-making supposes, that the level of the
discount rate only slightly changes the assumed altruism and egoism, respectively, but it never
changes the basic model structure. If we want to argue in altruism-models, it is meaningless to
use (very) high social discount rates to change the model structure into an egoism-model.
However, only the renunciation of social discounting leads in egoism-models to the fulfillment
of generational equal treatment.15
In summary, discrimination against certain generations in intertemporal decision making is real-
ized principally by the fundamental decision of using a special type of model and does not pri-
marily depend on the level of different utility discount rates.
4 Some Applications and Consequences with respect to Global Warming
In light of these considerations, results of some simulations with respect to global warming
done e.g. by Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger (1998) ("altruistic" OLG-Model) or Nordhaus
(1994) (optimal growth model) are not surprising.16 In his famous study using the DICE-
Model Nordhaus concludes that the best strategy for climate change policy is to wait and see.
Future damages are discounted with a social utility discount rate of 3% p.a. until the end of the
planning horizon. Immediate abatement induces sharp consumption decreases, which lead to
diminishing consumption units (increasing investment units) and, therefore, utilities for cur-
rently living generations. The returns are available for later living individuals, their con-
                                               
14
 The argumentation is analogic for low levels of the utility discount rates in both model types.
15
 Introducing negative social discount rates in egoism-models - which is completely unusual in all kinds of
models of this type - we are able to depict altruistic behavior of a societal decision-maker. Future utility units
are of higher present values in comparison to earlier occurring ones. Obviously, the requirement for equal
treatment is not fulfilled in this case as well.
16
 See Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger (1998) and Nordhaus (1994).
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sumption units increase, but these positive effects are (heavily) discounted. Using a relatively
high social discount rate depicts pronounced egoism in his analysis.17
In contrast, Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger (1998) show that the Greenhouse-Gas-abatement-
policy (GHG) is too expensive in consumption units for today's living generations when using
an altruistic utility function. In comparison to extrinsically motivated agents, GHG-abatement
leads to drastic per capita consumption losses and capital overaccumulation. However, this is
only an incomplete representation. The underlying altruistic welfare function takes consump-
tion utilities of future generations into account in today's utility maximizing decisions. Positive
saving units today imply a reduction of original utility of today's living generations but increase
the welfare level of future generations according to the internal rate of return of additional in-
vestments. Altruistic utilities do not demand physical consumption units, only the expectation
of positive future utilities increases the generation-specific welfare today. In spite of physical
consumption losses because of GHG-abatement activities, today's living generations can be
better off because of (drastic) increasing altruistic utilities. Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger
(1998) assume - applying a welfare function according to equation (1) - that drastic per capita
losses of nowadays living generations imply welfare losses for them. This is unreasonable if we
concentrate on welfare levels. If they use a welfare function in accordance with equation (1)
multiple (altruistic) considerations of original utility units increase current living generations
welfare-levels. Therefore, a welfare comparison has to be undertaken. Despite drastic diminish-
ing per capita consumption units of today's living generations, it is highly uncertain whether a
welfare comparison leads to the same results as those in the analysis of Stephan/Müller-
Fürstenberger (1998). In other words: If Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger (1998) argue, that
GHG-abatement causes economic costs (losses in consumption units per head), then the only
possibility to get this result is to set the social discount rate so high, that altruism vanishes
completely. Although they explicitly employ an ex-ante altruistic welfare function, they argue
ex-post egoistically because of diminished (neglected) considerations of altruistic utility units.18
This explains the similarities to the results of Nordhaus' ex-ante egoism approach (DICE-
model). Therefore, the analysis undertaken by Stephan/Müller-Fürstenberger (1998) can in fact
be interpreted as an ex-post egoism analysis using an ex-ante altruistic welfare function.
A more appropriate approach in intertemporal decision making which takes into account effi-
ciency aspects, distributional ones, and equal treatment of all affected generations from a so-
                                               
17
 See Bayer (2000), p. 54, for some calculations with the DICE-model and varying utility discount rates. The
original social discount rate of 3% implies an emissions reduction rate of 8.8%. However, abatement increases
to 38.8% when a social discount rate of 0% is used.
18
 One could say that they argue in case 2 (chapter 3).
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cietal viewpoint is given in the GAD:19 An adequate assignment to intra- as well as intergen-
erational (project-induced) effects is possible without assuming egoistic or altruistic behavior.
Most important for this approach is an exact registration of all project-induced consumption
effects at the time period of their occurrence. Utility effects are taken into account in an OLG-
model generation-adequately. This means that generation-specific consumption effects are val-
ued according to the respective welfare level of each generation. During its respective life,
each generation is allowed to discount future consumption units in accordance with their own
utility discount rate. To determine social present values, we (usually) have to discount inter-
generationally. Therefore, it is forbidden to discount utility units to the planning time period,
but necessary to discount consumption units according to the growth discount rate. If cost-
benefit-analyses are carried out in utility units, we have to consider that the diminishing mar-
ginal utility of consumption is already taken into account. In case that a social planner dis-
counts generation-specific utility effects to the planning time period once again, discounting
will be undertaken twice ("double discounting"). This allows today's living generations to act
egoistically and altruistically, respectively, according to their individual preferences.20 Over-
rating of future generations' utility effects according to an altruistic utility function will be pre-
vented because of the exact registration of all occurring effects. Arbitrary discrimination of
future generations, which occurs in egoism-models, is avoided as well.
5 Conclusions
Our analysis has worked out that we have to distinguish between two different "utility discount
rates": Firstly, the altruism-parameter which is used by each generation to discount their altru-
istic utility units. Secondly, in aggregating generation specific lifetime-utilities a societal deci-
sion-maker discounts them to the beginning of the planning-horizon by using a social discount
rate. This intuitively shows that "the" utility discount rate as an altruism- or egoism-parameter
does not exist. In more detail, a zero altruism-parameter ("renunciation of utility discounting")
depicts complete altruism of each generation in altruism-models. However, using zero social
discount rates in egoism-models implies equal treatment of all affected generations, respec-
tively. On the other hand, complete altruism implies multiple considerations of project-induced
utility effects to a large extent from a societal viewpoint. Future generations dominate today's
                                               
19
 See Bayer/Cansier (1998), Bayer/Cansier (1999) and Bayer (2000).
20
 These considerations can be found in risk theory as well. The subjective risk attitude is taken into account in
each individual's expected utility function. If an additional societal risk evaluation is undertaken, for example,
by a social planner with objective societal risk attitudes, the risk effect is considered twice. This leads to an
overrating of the risk component analogic to our discounting problem (see e.g. Siebert (1998)).
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decisions on the efficiency of certain projects. Multiple considerations have to be prevented
due to their arbitrary distortions in favor of future generations. The more altruistic the behavior
of today's living generations is, the more distorted are intertemporal decisions in altruism-mod-
els at the expense of today's living generations.
Arguing in a neoclassical model-framework, equal treatment of generations has to be taken
into account as reference for intertemporal comparisons. In altruism-models, therefore, the
altruism-parameter has to be set to high values. On the other hand, the use of high values for
social discount rates depicts pronounced egoistic behavior. Thus, the level of "the" discount
rate is not sufficient to decide whether a specific model argues altruistically and egoistically,
respectively: Only in egoism-models the fulfillment of intergenerational neutrality from a socie-
tal viewpoint is guaranteed by neglecting social discounting. However, setting the altruism-pa-
rameter to zero in altruism-models, equal treatment can never be reached. We conclude that
there are inherent inefficiencies in egoism- as well as altruism-models. This is mainly not due to
the choice of the utility discount rate because varying positive discount rates cannot reverse an
existing egoism(altruism)-model into an altruism(egoism)-one. It is rather the choice of the
respective welfare function which induces these distortions.
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